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WILL THE SUPREME COURT RECOVER ITS OWN 
FUMBLE? HOW ALSTON CAN REPAIR THE DAMAGE 
RESULTING FROM NCAA’S SPORTS LEAGUE 
EXEMPTION 
Alan J. Meese* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Horizontal restraints are unlawful per se unless a court can 
identify some redeeming virtue that such restraints may create.  In 
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Oklahoma (“NCAA”),1 the Supreme Court rejected this 
standard, refusing to condemn horizontal restraints on price and 
output imposed by the NCAA without specifying any possible 
redeeming virtues.2  The Court emphasized that other restraints not 
before the Court were necessary to create and maintain athletic 
competition like that supervised by the NCAA.3  This exemption for 
sports leagues ensures that all restraints imposed by such entities 
merit Rule of Reason scrutiny, regardless of how harmful they 
appear. 
 Building on a forthcoming article,4 this Essay contends that 
NCAA’s sports league exemption contravenes traditional antitrust 
principles, including the ancillary restraints doctrine (which NCAA 
ignored). This Essay also argues that the exemption increases the 
number of false negatives and potentially impedes the conduct of Rule 
of Reason analysis.  Finally, this Essay explains how the exemption 
inspired and informed an ill-advised doctrinal innovation, the so-
called “Quick Look” methodology of Rule of Reason analysis, whereby 
courts condemn certain restraints “in the twinkling of an eye.”5  Some 
lower courts have recently extrapolated from this approach and 
exempted restraints limiting rivalry for the services of student 
 
 *. Ball Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for the Study of Law and 
Markets, William & Mary Law School. The author thanks the editors of the Wake 
Forest Law Review, both print and online editions, for their thoughtful edits and 
diligent efforts. 
 1.  468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 2.  Infra Part III.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See Alan J. Meese, Requiem for a Lightweight: How NCAA Continues to 
Distort Antitrust Doctrine, 56 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2021). 
 5. See Areeda, infra note 78, at 37–38. 
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athletes from Rule of Reason scrutiny, rendering such restraints 
lawful per se.6 
 The United States Supreme Court is currently reviewing the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. 
Alston, which condemned NCAA regulations limiting the size of 
athletic scholarships.7  This Essay provides the Alston Court with a 
roadmap for eliminating the sports league exemption, thereby placing 
such restraints on equal footing with restraints imposed by other 
entities.  The Essay also advises the Court to reject lower court 
decisions that built upon the Quick Look doctrine and have treated 
restraints governing student athlete eligibility as lawful per se, thus 
exempting them from Rule of Reason scrutiny.  Finally, the Essay 
concludes that the restraints before the Court in Alston may well 
produce cognizable antitrust benefits by overcoming the market 
failure that would result from unbridled rivalry for the services of 
student athletes. The Essay submits that the Court should articulate 
a Rule of Reason methodology in Alston that reflects the non-
technological nature of such efficiencies. 
II.  THE RULE OF REASON AND THE PER SE RULE 
The Sherman Act bans agreements “in restraint of trade.”8 In 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,9 the Court read the 
Act to prohibit only agreements that restrain trade “unreasonably,”10 
i.e., produce monopoly or its consequences: higher prices, reduced 
output.  and/or reduced quality.11  Ordinary application of this Rule 
of Reason is fact-intensive, requiring plaintiffs to establish that the 
restraint produces concrete antitrust harm.12  But certain restraints 
are “unlawful per se,” and do not warrant full-blown analysis.13  In 
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States (“NPR”), the Court 
articulated a two-part standard for determining whether restraints 
in a particular category are always unreasonable and thus unlawful 
per se.14  NPR requires courts to ask two questions about restraints 
in the category: do such restraints produce a “pernicious effect on 
competition” and, if so, do they also always lack redeeming virtues.15   
Despite NPR’s reference to pernicious effects, application of this 
first prong does not require a judicial prediction that restraints will 
 
 6. See infra nn.96–98.   
 7. 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., 141 S.Ct. 1231 (2020) 
(mem.). 
 8.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 9. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 10.  Id. at 51.  
 11.  Id. at 52 (listing three “evils which led to the public outcry against 
monopolies”). 
 12. Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977). 
 13.  See generally N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States (“NPR“), 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 14. Id. at 5. 
 15. Id.; see also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (quoting NPR with approval). 
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produce actual economic harm.16  Instead, courts treat elimination of 
rivalry as itself a “pernicious effect.”17  Numerous garden variety 
restraints, including formation of partnerships and restraints 
ancillary thereto, produce a “pernicious effect” under this prong.18  
Whether this standard condemns a restraint thus turns on the second 
prong, namely, whether restraints lack redeeming virtues.19  For 
example, price fixing between two independent lawyers is unlawful 
per se because such agreements cannot create redeeming virtues.20  
But formation of a partnership by the same lawyers might produce 
redeeming virtues and thus merits Rule of Reason treatment.21  Both 
restraints extinguish horizontal price rivalry.  But formation of the 
partnership may also produce redeeming virtues.22 
The NPR standard post-dates the ancillary restraints doctrine.23  
But both doctrines ultimately ask the same question about horizontal 
restraints: can eliminating rivalry also produce efficiency benefits?  
While the NPR standard takes a categorical approach, the ancillary 
restraints doctrine applies case-by-case.24  Repeated applications of 
the ancillary restraints doctrine could establish that particular 
 
 16. Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 94–95 (2003) (recognizing that the Court defines 
“anticompetitive” broadly). 
 17.  Id. at 94 (explaining that the Court has “equated the term [‘competition’] 
with ‘rivalry’ for the purpose of per se analysis, with the result that any 
coordination of previously independent activity is anticompetitive”). 
 18. Id. at 95. 
 19. Id. at 96. 
 20. See id. at 96–98. 
 21. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price 
Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 383 (1966) (distinguishing 
between antitrust’s treatment of naked price fixing and “close-knit combinations” 
such as partnerships on this basis); Richard A. Givens, Affirmative Benefits to 
Industrial Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 36 IND. L. J. 51, 52–53 (1960) 
(concluding that “‘lack of any redeeming virtue’ is the chief distinction between 
those kinds of loose-knit combinations which are held in unreasonable restraint 
of trade in and of themselves and the close-knit combinations”); Alan J. Meese, 
In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should 
Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 849–51 (2016) (explaining the NPR 
standard’s disparate treatment of naked price fixing and the formation of 
partnerships). 
 22. Bork, supra note 21, at 383.  
 23. See generally United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th 
Cir. 1898) (articulating the ancillary restraints doctrine sixty years before NPR). 
 24. Compare N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States (“NPR”), 356 U.S. 1, 5 (stating 
that “[the] principle of per se unreasonableness . . . makes the type of restraints 
proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain . . . .”), with Addyston Pipe, 85 F. 271 
at 282–83 (illustrating that the “very statement of the rule” implies that the court 
must determine whether “the contract [at issue is] one in which there is a main 
purpose, to which the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary”). 
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categories of restraints never or sometimes produce redeeming 
virtues, thus informing application of the NPR standard.25 
If restraints cannot produce such virtues, courts may safely 
conclude that parties have invested resources to create an agreement 
that restricts rivalry with no prospect of efficiencies.  This conclusion 
implies that the parties believe they can exercise market power.26  
Even if the parties are incorrect, condemnation of such restraints does 
no harm and deters future price fixing.27 
  If restraints may produce such virtues, further inquiry is 
warranted regarding their ultimate impact.  Moreover, a court 
assessing such restraints under full-blown Rule of Reason analysis 
must begin by assuming that the restraint before it might produce 
such benefits and calibrate the methodology of such inquiry 
accordingly. 
The Court initially recognized very few redeeming virtues, 
limiting the category to what Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson 
describes as technological efficiencies.28  Beginning with Continental 
T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,29 the Court has repeatedly recognized a 
different category of virtues—namely, correction of market failures 
that would occur if parties to the restraint had instead continued 
unbridled rivalry.30  As this Essay submits, the methodology of full-








 25. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) 
(explaining that restraints are condemned as unlawful per se “[o]nce experience 
with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence 
that the Rule of Reason will condemn it”). 
 26. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 
(1990) (“Very few firms that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently 
foolish to enter into conspiracies to fix prices.”) (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX, 269 (1978)); Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 221 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., for the court). 
 27.  Areeda, infra note 78, at 21–22. 
 28. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 7 
(1985) (“The prevailing orientation toward economic organization [during this 
period] was that technological features of firm and market organization were 
determinative.”); see also Meese, supra note 16, at 124–32 (documenting how the 
Supreme Court relied upon the applied price theory tradition that Williamson 
discusses when expanding the scope of the per se rule). 
 29. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  
 30. Id. at 55 (explaining how non-standard agreements could ensure 
production of services retailers might not provide “in a purely competitive 
situation”). 
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III.  NCAA’S MISAPPLICATION/IGNORANCE OF NPR AND RESULTING 
SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION 
In Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association,31 the Court evaluated an agreement 
setting the price and output of televised college football games.32  
Plaintiffs University of Georgia and University of Oklahoma, who 
presumably supported restrictions on player compensation, 
challenged the price and output restrictions.33 Courts at the time 
defined redeeming virtues narrowly in the horizontal context, 
banning as unlawful per se restraints that seemed plainly ancillary to 
legitimate ventures.34  Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit rejected 
automatic condemnation, at least arguendo, and assessed whether 
the restraints were ancillary to the NCAA’s legitimate venture.35  
Answering this question in the negative, the court condemned the 
restraints.36 
The defendants reiterated their invocation of the ancillary 
restraints doctrine in the Supreme Court in NCAA.37  However, the 
Court did not mention the NPR standard or the ancillary concept.  
Thus, the Court did not ask whether the restraints might produce 
redeeming virtues or enhance the efficiency of a valid venture.  
Instead, the Court immunized the restraints before it from per se 
condemnation because the NCAA had adopted other restraints not 
before the Court that would survive per se condemnation.38  Such 
other restraints included horizontal agreements ensuring that 
players were bona fide students and were not semi-professional 
athletes that vaguely associated with the university.39  These latter 
rules, the Court said, included bans on paying players. 
Lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit in In re National 
Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation (“Alston”),40 have properly read NCAA to exempt restraints 
imposed by sports leagues from per se condemnation, regardless of 
whether the restraint may produce redeeming virtues.41  As Professor 
Hovenkamp has explained, this exemption would “shelter an 
agreement between member schools fixing the price of admission 
 
 31. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 32.  Id. at 1149–50. 
 33.  Id. 
 34. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–12 (1972). 
 35. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 707 F.2d at 1153–54. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Brief for Respondents at 23, Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271), 1984 WL 1036477, 
*23.  
 38.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.  
 39.  Id. at 102. 
 40. 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).  
 41. See, e.g., id. at 1256; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069–1070 (9th 
Cir. 2015); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017–1020 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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tickets or of hot dogs purchased in the stands.”42  Unlike restraints 
that merit Rule of Reason scrutiny because they survive the NPR 
standard or the ancillary restraints test, restraints enjoying the 
sports league exemption will necessarily include entire categories of 
restraints that would ordinarily be unlawful per se because they 
cannot produce redeeming virtues.  Thus, courts cannot assume there 
is some probability that such restraints might produce redeeming 
virtues.  Instead, courts must assume that application of NPR’s 
second prong would condemn some such restraints as unlawful per se. 
By invoking restraints not before it to justify the sports league 
exemption, the Court assumed that such restraints would themselves 
avoid per se condemnation.  This assumption was surprising, given 
the Court’s recent condemnation of apparently beneficial horizontal 
restraints in decisions it expressly reaffirmed.43  While the Court 
admitted that restrictions on player compensation prevented price 
competition, it opined that unbridled rivalry for the services of 
student athletes would transform the NCAA into a semi-professional 
league, tarnishing the league’s brand—college football—associated 
with an academic tradition.44  The Court analogized such restraints 
to vertical agreements that simultaneously restricted intra-brand 
rivalry but enhanced inter-brand competition by overcoming market 
failure.45  Lower courts have read this language as retracting the 
scope of the per se rule vis a vis horizontal restraints more generally.46  
IV.  THE SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION HAS NO BASIS 
NCAA’s sports league exemption saved numerous restraints, 
including those before it, from a substantially overinclusive per se 
rule.47  Many such restraints were likely procompetitive.  Perhaps the 
exemption was a second-best tactic for mitigating the anti-consumer 
impact of an overly broad per se rule.  The Supreme Court, however, 
has undermined this justification by narrowing the scope of the per se 
rule.  Moreover, this exemption contradicts basic antitrust principles 
and has produced other negative consequences, including an 
additional and stronger exemption, as described below in Part V. 
The Court did not explain why antitrust treatment of restraints 
not before it determines the per se status of those restraints that are.  
 
 42. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The NCAA and the Rule of Reason, 52 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 323, 324–26 (2017) (reading NCAA in this manner); see also Alan J. 
Meese, Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice 
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1791–92 (2006). 
 43.  See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. at 608–12; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 & 
nn.18–19 (citing Topco with approval).  
 44.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101–02.  
 45. Id. at 103 (“[A] restraint in a limited aspect of a market may actually 
enhance market-wide competition.”).  
 46. Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
Polk Bros, Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 47. See, e.g., O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1057. 
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Horizontal cooperation is necessary to create and maintain numerous 
other ventures besides sports leagues.48  However, courts do not 
immunize restraints imposed by such other ventures from per se 
condemnation simply because the restraints accompany a valid 
venture.  Instead, courts employ the ancillary restraints doctrine to 
test whether such restraints might produce cognizable benefits that 
further the venture and thus warrant an additional fact-based 
assessment.49  The content and nature of this threshold inquiry 
assumes that sometimes the answer to this question will be “no.” That 
is, some restraints that accompany an otherwise valid joint venture 
cannot produce any cognizable benefits but will instead simply reduce 
rivalry simpliciter.50  Courts condemn such restraints while allowing 
the venture to proceed.51 
Robert Bork, who rehabilitated the ancillary restraints doctrine, 
endorsed this approach in a path-breaking article.52  Bork explained 
that horizontal restraints that accompanied lawful ventures were not 
ancillary if they were “incapable of adding to the efficiency of the 
integration which they seemingly accompany.”53  Bork instanced a 
restrictive covenant that accompanied formation of a “product safety 
testing laboratory” by horizontal rivals.54  The formation and 
operation of the laboratory would constitute lawful concerted action, 
just like formation and continued operation of the NCAA.55  Still, 
Bork concluded that the covenant could not be ancillary and was thus 
unlawful per se.56  Bork’s analysis confirms that is no reason to treat 
 
 48. See Alan J. Meese, Requiem for a Lightweight: How NCAA Continues to 
Distort Antitrust Doctrine, 56 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2021). 
 49. Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 224 (“To be ancillary, and hence exempt 
from the per se rule, an agreement eliminating competition must . . . serve[] to 
make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose. Of course, 
the restraint imposed must be related to the efficiency sought to be achieved.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 50. See, e.g., In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1275 (1979) (Pitofsky, 
Commissioner), aff’d 657 F. 2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Polygram Holding v. 
FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that a restraint that accompanied an 
otherwise legitimate venture could produce no cognizable benefits). 
 51. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 38–39. 
 52. See Bork, supra note 21, at 380; see also Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (“A 
court must ask whether an agreement promoted enterprise and productivity at 
the time it was adopted. If it arguably did, then the court must apply the Rule of 
Reason . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 53. Bork, supra note 21, at 383 (emphasis added). 
 54. Id.  
 55. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 197–200 (2010) (treating 
conduct of a corporation jointly owned by thirty-two NFL teams as concerted 
action because agreement joined “independent centers of decision making”); 
Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 214–15 (analogizing challenged restraints to those 
challenged in Topco and NCAA and concluding that all such restraints were 
concerted action). 
 56. Bork, supra note 21, at 382–84; id. at 384 (treating non-ancillary 
restraints as unlawful per se).  It should not matter that restraints that 
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restraints that accompany sports leagues more favorably  than those 
that accompany other ventures when applying the NPR standard. 
V.  RETAINING THE SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION DOES POSITIVE HARM 
Perhaps the sports league exemption is a case of “no harm, no 
foul.”  Most exempted restraints would merit Rule of Reason scrutiny 
under more recent applications of the NPR standard anyway.  
Moreover, both NPR and Rule of Reason analysis ultimately ask 
whether challenged restraints produce monopoly or its 
consequences.57  Per se condemnation reflects a conclusion that Rule 
of Reason analysis will condemn the restraint.58  As shown below, 
however, the sports league exemption still does positive harm, both 
by weakening the per se rule and also by distorting related aspects of 
antitrust doctrines. In particular, the exemption has contributed to a 
distortion of the methodology of Rule of Reason analysis that courts 
apply and not merely those adopted by sports leagues. 
A. The Sports League Exemption Deters Legitimate Challenges 
and Increases False Negatives. 
Full-blown Rule of Reason analysis is not free.  Plaintiffs must 
expend resources to establish a prima facie case by proving either: (1) 
the restraint produces actual detrimental effects or (2) the parties 
possess the economic power necessary to impose harm.59  Defendants 
can contest these assertions, further increasing adjudication costs.  
Plaintiffs fail to establish such a case 97 percent of the time.60  
Presumably, numerous potential plaintiffs do not attempt such a 
showing, leaving harmful restraints unchallenged.  Knowing this, 
defendants will, at the margin, adopt some unambiguously harmful 
restraints they otherwise would not have adopted, knowing, as they 
will, that the sports league exemption will raise the bar for plaintiffs 
challenging such restraints.61  In sum, the sports league exemption 
both increases the number of false negatives and encourages 
additional harmful restraints. 
 
accompany a joint venture “are likely to survive the Rule of Reason” in the context 
of sports leagues.  See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203.  This is equally true with 
respect to restraints that accompany other joint ventures. 
 57. Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692–93 (explaining that the per se 
rule and full-blown Rule of Reason scrutiny are “two complimentary categories of 
Rule of Reason analysis” and that “[i]n either event, the purpose of the analysis 
is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint”). 
 58. See Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. at 344. 
 59.  See Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(describing these alternative means of establishing a prima facie case). 
 60. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st 
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827–29; 837 (2009). 
 61. This impact will also alter the ratio of harmful to beneficial restraints in 
this category. 
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B. The Sports League Exemption Distorts the Rule of Reason 
Methodology That Courts Employ. 
Rule of Reason methodology should turn upon the nature of 
possible redeeming virtues that save restraints from per se 
condemnation.  Application of the NPR standard and ancillary 
restraints doctrine, both of which NCAA ignored, identifies the 
relevant virtues, if any, that restraints might produce.  If such virtues 
are technological, the three-part Rule of Reason test applied in Alston 
and informed by NCAA is generally appropriate.62  Proof of higher 
prices (or in Alston, reduced compensation) should establish a prima 
facie case, casting upon the defendants a burden to adduce evidence 
of such efficiencies.63  If defendants satisfy this burden, plaintiffs can 
prove a less restrictive alternative or show that the restraint’s harms 
exceed its benefits.64  This framework assumes whatever benefits 
defendants prove coexist with the harms that plaintiffs purportedly 
demonstrated to establish a prima facie case.65 
However, some restraints survive per se condemnation because 
they may produce non-technological efficiencies by overcoming 
 
 62.  Alston, 958 F.3d at 1256 (invoking and applying Rule of Reason’s three-
part framework). 
 63. NCAA opined that the defendants there bore a “heavy burden of 
establishing an affirmative defense[.]” Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. Of 
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).  Such an approach makes 
sense with respect to explicit price and/or output restraints that apparently 
cannot produce redeeming virtues.  However, lower courts, including Alston, have 
generalized this language, applying this standard to restraints that would 
survive per se condemnation under the NPR standard because they may produce 
redeeming virtues.  See Alston, 958 F.3d at 1257 (describing the NCAA’s “‘heavy 
burden’” of “‘competitively justify[ing]’” its undisputed “‘deviation from the 
operations of a free market’” under the Rule of Reason) (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. 
at 113)).  There is, however, no warrant for imposing upon defendants more than 
the traditional burden of production when a restraint properly survives per se 
condemnation under the NPR standard.  See Meese, supra note 16, at 108 n.156 
(collecting authorities characterizing defendants’ burden as a burden of 
production).  Thus, exemption of the naked restraints before it from per se 
condemnation resulted in a misleading and non-generalizable pronouncement 
regarding this aspect of Rule of Reason analysis. 
 64.  The exact nature of this balancing, of course, will depend on the welfare 
standard that the court selects.  See generally Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, 
The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 
ANTITRUST L.J. 471 (2012). 
 65. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Trade-offs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). See also Law, 134 F.3d at 1017 
(holding that, after plaintiffs make out a prima facie case, “[t]he inquiry then 
shifts to an evaluation of whether the procompetitive virtues of the alleged 
wrongful conduct justifies the otherwise anticompetitive impacts” (emphasis 
added)). 
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market failure.66  Here, a price-based standard makes no sense.  If 
restraints overcome market failure, pre-restraint prices reflect a 
poorly functioning market that the restraint corrects.  Such prices are 
not a useful benchmark for comparison to post-restraint prices.  
Instead, proof that post-restraint prices exceed the pre-restraint 
baseline is entirely consistent with a conclusion that the agreement 
overcomes a market failure and produces redeeming virtues, the 
prospect of which resulted in Rule of Reason treatment.67  Antitrust 
procedure thus precludes allowing plaintiffs to prevail based solely 
upon such evidence.68 
Moreover, once a plaintiff does make out a prima facie case in 
whatever way, proof that the restraint produces significant non-
technological benefits undermines the rationale for balancing 
benefits against harms.  Such balancing presumes that the restraint 
produces simultaneous harms and benefits, like a merger to monopoly 
that generates economies of scale that may offset the transaction’s 
harms.69  However, a defendant’s showing that a restraint overcomes 
a market failure undermines the assumption that benefits coexist 
with harms.70  Instead, the evidence is at least equally consistent with 
the conclusion that the restraint only produces benefits—benefits 
that manifest themselves as prices higher than those produced by the 
pre-restraint, poorly functioning market.71  Similar logic undermines 
the search for “less restrictive” alternatives, because there is no 
reason to assume that the challenged restraint is “restrictive” in the 
first place. 
The sports league exemption deprives courts of the information 
necessary to ascertain what Rule of Reason methodology makes 
sense.  Alston may be such a case. 
C. The Exemption Encouraged Adoption of an Ill-Considered 
“Quick Look” Methodology of Rule of Reason Analysis. 
The restraint before the Court in NCAA expressly set price and 
output.  Without identifying any redeeming virtues, the Court 
 
 66. Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the 
Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 21 
(2005). 
 67. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 
878, 882–85, 889–90, 893, 896–98 (2007) (holding that higher retail prices 
resulting from additional promotion are not antitrust harm).   
 68. Meese, supra note 16, at 100–01. 
 69. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The 
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
 70. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive 
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209, 
278, 278 nn.216–17 (1986) (explaining that courts often treat proof of efficiencies 
as reason to scrutinize more carefully claims that the restraint produced harms 
in the first place). 
 71. See Meese, supra note 16, at 163–65.   
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nonetheless assessed the restraints under the Rule of Reason, 
because they accompanied a sports league and were thus exempt from 
the NPR standard.72  The Court began by invoking the District 
Court’s findings that the restraint had increased prices compared to 
a (hypothetical) non-restraint baseline.73  Absent possible redeeming 
virtues, this price-based method of making out a prima facie case 
made perfect sense.  Nonetheless, the NCAA contended that the 
plaintiffs’ case should fail absent proof that the defendants possessed 
sufficient shares of a properly defined market.74   
The Court could have invoked its ultimate conclusion that the 
defendants did, in fact, possess a large share of a properly defined 
market.75  Instead, the Court issued a broader pronouncement, 
applicable well-beyond the case before it, regardless of a defendant’s 
market position.  In a passage that quoted National Society of 
Professional Engineers v. United States,76 the Court announced: 
As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power does 
not justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the 
contrary, when there is an agreement not to compete in terms 
of price or output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is required to 
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an 
agreement.’77 
The Court also quoted Professor Areeda’s assertion that some 
restraints were so obviously harmful that courts could condemn them 
“‘in the twinkling of an eye.’”78 
The Court’s quotation of Professional Engineers suggests that it 
equated “naked” restraints with those that could not produce 
redeeming virtues.79  Combined with the “twinkling of an eye” 
metaphor, this language inspired the so-called “Quick Look” 
methodology of Rule of Reason analysis.80 Under this approach, 
plaintiffs may avoid establishing actual detrimental effects or market 
power if they convince the tribunal that, while not unlawful per se, 
 
 72.  See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107–08. 
 73. See id. at 104–108.  While the Court also claimed that the restraints had 
reduced output, it made no effort to adjust that reduction for the quality of the 
remaining games. Id. 
 74. Brief for Petitioner at 33–34, NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83-271). 
 75. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 111–113; see also id. at 115, 115 n.55 (resting the 
rejection of one of the defendants’ justifications on finding that the defendants 
possessed market power).  
 76. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 77. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 (quoting Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692). 
 78. See id. at 109 n.39 (quoting Phillip Areeda, The “Rule of Reason” in 
Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37–38 (Federal Judicial Center, June 1981) 
(parenthetical omitted), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Antitrust.pdf 
(last visited June 9, 2021). 
 79.  See Meese, supra note 42, at 1780, 1789–91, 1800 (reading Professional 
Engineers in this manner). 
 80. Id. at 1801–02. 
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the restraint is nonetheless “inherently suspect.”81  Initially, some 
proponents touted the Quick Look as a pro-defendant “safety valve” 
that tempered an overbroad per se rule.82 
As a matter of decision theory, this approach makes perfect sense 
in a case like NCAA.  If a particular class of restraint is usually 
anticompetitive and rarely, if ever, produces benefits, the chance of 
false positives is extremely low.  Reducing plaintiffs’ burden of 
establishing a prima facie case would (properly) encourage such 
challenges and minimize the resources expended on litigation.   
However, advocates and courts have not confined the Quick Look 
to restraints deemed “naked” because they lack redeeming virtues.83  
Indeed, the Alston plaintiffs began their argument before the 
Supreme Court by attempting to expand the definition of “naked,” 
contending that the challenged restraints were “naked,” despite the 
finding below that they produced significant benefits.84  Moreover, 
scholars and courts have held out the possibility that a restraint may 
be inherently suspect and thus subject to the Quick Look, regardless 
of whether it is “naked” as defined by NCAA.85  Once courts and 
agencies created the Quick Look methodology, plaintiffs naturally 
pressed courts to declare numerous restraints “inherently suspect,” 
hoping to eliminate the burden of establishing antitrust harm.86  The 
result has been an increase in expensive and distracting disputes 
about whether various restraints are “inherently suspect”—disputes 
that defendants almost always win.87  The cost of such disputes 
produces no offsetting social benefits, as failure to establish that a 
restraint is inherently suspect relegates plaintiffs to the standard 
requirement to prove anticompetitive harm anyway. 
To be sure, a more expansive definition of “inherently suspect” 
could seemingly lighten plaintiffs’ burdens in a larger number of 
cases.  However, proponents of the Quick Look have not offered a 
 
 81. See, e.g., Polygram Holding v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33, 36–37 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (detailing and applying this approach). 
 82. See Meese, supra note 21, at 873. 
 83. See, e.g., Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35 (detailing this approach).  
 84. Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, NCAA v. Alston, No. 20-512 (Mar. 
31, 2021). 
 85. See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: 
The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 777–81 (2012) 
(endorsing application of the Quick Look to restraints regardless of how they 
avoid per se condemnation); Meese, supra note 21, at 866 n.165 (collecting 
numerous decisions asking whether numerous restraints, including exclusive 
dealing contracts, are “inherently suspect”). 
 86. See Meese, supra note 21, at 864–65 (describing plaintiffs’ strong 
incentives to convince tribunals that challenged restraints are “inherently 
suspect” so as to avoid almost certain failure to establish a prima facie case under 
standard Rule of Reason analysis); id. at 863 (explaining that the first step in 
Rule of Reason analysis is to ask whether a restraint is inherently suspect). 
 87.  Id. at 866 n.165 (collecting numerous decisions evaluating and (nearly) 
always rejecting plaintiff’s claim that restraint was “inherently suspect”). 
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tractable methodology for distinguishing “inherently suspect” 
restraints from those properly assessed under full-blown Rule of 
Reason analysis.88  Absent such a methodology, the pro-plaintiff 
Quick Look is probably best reserved for those restraints that do not 
merit Rule of Reason scrutiny in the first place—a set that would be 
empty if courts properly and uniformly applied the NPR standard and 
ancillary restraints test. 
In any event, the Quick Look has always rested on shaky 
jurisprudential ground.89  NCAA’s suggestion that the nakedness of a 
restraint itself establishes a prima facie case was dicta, given the 
district court’s finding that the restraint produced actual detrimental 
effects.90  Moreover, Professor Areeda’s “twinkling of an eye” 
metaphor described a hypothetical case in which courts determined 
at the summary judgment stage that defendants possessed a 
dominant market position and thus market power.91  This conclusion 
did not support any suggestion that the mere existence of a restraint, 
no matter how apparently harmful, could itself establish a prima facie 
case.92  Finally, while the Supreme Court has endorsed the Quick 
Look in concept,93 it has never condemned a restraint under the Rule 
of Reason without first finding that the agreement produced concrete 
anticompetitive harm.94 
Moreover, NCAA’s assertion that “naked” restraints should 
themselves establish a prima facie case regardless of market share or 
anticompetitive effects was dicta, given the Court’s holding that the 
plaintiffs had in fact established market power and actual 
detrimental effects.  Finally, the actual agreement before the Court, 
which could not produce redeeming virtues, bore little meaningful 
resemblance to restraints such as those in Alston that could produce 
such virtues.  It would thus be hazardous, to say the least, to 
generalize these dicta to apply to potentially beneficial restraints.95  
Indeed, the only restraints that would seem analogous to those before 
the NCAA Court are those that should be condemned as unlawful per 
se in the first place.  NCAA’s unjustified exemption of the restraints 
 
 88. See id. at 876–80. 
 89. See Alan J. Meese, The Rule of Reason’s Prima Facie Case: Did Harvard 
Get it Right?, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE (2021) (forthcoming). 
 90. See Meese, supra note 21, at 856 & n.104 (explaining why this language 
was dicta). 
 91.  See Areeda, supra note 78, at 37–38. 
 92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 93. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 94. See Meese, supra note 21, at 856 & n.104 (explaining that Supreme Court 
decisions endorsing or implying a Quick Look approach are dicta); see also, e.g., 
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770–81 (rejecting application of the Quick Look to 
the case before it). 
 95. See generally Neal Devins & Alan J. Meese, Judicial Review and 
Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 FLA. STATE L. REV. 323 (2005) (contending that 
precedents adopted in cases with idiosyncratic facts may not reflect appropriate 
consideration of factors that should inform the resulting rule). 
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before it from per se condemnation thus inspired a methodology of 
Rule of Reason analysis that was in fact only appropriate for 
restraints that were not properly subject to Rule of Reason analysis 
in the first place. 
 
D.  NCAA Inspired a New and More Powerful Exemption. 
NCAA spawned another, more powerful exemption, one squarely 
before the Court in Alston.  The Quick Look’s logic cuts both ways.  If 
some restraints that survive per se condemnation are almost always 
harmful on balance, presumably some are nearly always beneficial.  
An antitrust regime could reflect this fact, making it especially 
difficult for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case and/or easier for 
defendants to rebut such a case.  Over a decade ago, the Seventh 
Circuit embraced such logic, holding that a NCAA Bylaw is 
“presumed procompetitive” when it is “clearly meant to help maintain 
the ‘revered tradition of amateurism in college sports’ or the 
‘preservation of the student-athlete in higher education.’”96  The court 
built upon dicta in American Needle, Inc v. National Football 
League,97 which itself invoked NCAA’s mistranslation of Professor 
Areeda’s “twinkling of an eye” metaphor.98 
Defendants have invoked this line of precedent, albeit without 
the term “Quick Look,” preferring instead the phrase “twinkling of an 
eye.”99  Indeed, this pro-defendant approach is really a rule of per se 
legality and thus an outright exemption from antitrust scrutiny for 
covered restraints because the “presumption” in favor of such 
restraints is irrebuttable.100  It is likely no coincidence that this pro-
defendant irrebuttable presumption arose in the context of sports 
leagues in general and the question of student athlete eligibility in 
particular.  After all, the very existence of NCAA’s sports league 
exemption broadcasts that “sports are different” and are therefore 
susceptible to more relaxed antitrust scrutiny than more mundane 
commercial endeavors.  Thus, a pro-plaintiff methodology born from 
 
 96. See Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2018); Agnew v. 
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2012).  But see O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 
F.3d 1049, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting this approach and assessing 
restrictions under the Rule of Reason). 
 97. 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 98. Id. at 203; see also Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341 (quoting Am. Needle, 560 U.S. 
at 203). 
 99. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 19–20, 24–25, Nat. Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Alston, No. 20-512 (Oct. 2020) (invoking Agnew and Deppe); see also 
Transcript, supra note 84, at 7 (NCAA disclaiming reliance on the term Quick 
Look).  Of course, the NCAA is seeking more than what the Quick Look provides 
plaintiffs. 
 100.  See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 501–502 (holding that courts should dismiss 
challenges to such restraints on the pleadings without opportunity for rebuttal); 
Agnew, 683 F. 3d at 343, n.6 (same); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110, 119 (1989) (plurality opinion) (explaining that an irrebuttable presumption 
is really a substantive rule). 
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an unjustified sports league exemption has morphed into a second 
and more ironclad exemption. This Essay contends that the Court 
should reject this exemption as contrary to antitrust doctrine and 
policy.101 
VI.  WHAT THE COURT CAN DO ABOUT IT IN ALSTON 
What, then, can the Supreme Court do to correct for this 
untethered and harmful sports league exemption and the subsequent 
doctrinal consequences described above?  Most aggressively, the 
Court could order re-argument and add three questions for 
consideration: (1) are all restraints imposed by sports leagues exempt 
from per se condemnation under the NPR standard?; (2) do restraints 
such as those reviewed in Alston possibly produce redeeming virtues?; 
and (3) if so, what are those virtues?  After such re-argument, the 
Court could overrule that portion of NCAA creating the sports league 
exemption, while reiterating the condemnation of express limitations 
on price and output of televised games.102  The Court would then have 
to face the question that has eluded a fully considered decision since 
1984, namely, whether horizontal restrictions on player 
compensation can produce redeeming virtues and thus survive per se 
condemnation under the NPR standard. 
The Court could also take a different approach altogether, 
confining itself to the present record and arguments.  The Court could 
still begin by noting that it is only applying the exemption arguendo 
because neither party challenged it.  It could also note that it 
generated the exemption when courts misapplied the NPR standard 
and banned bona fide ancillary restraints, such that the exemption 
saved many procompetitive restraints from wrongful 
condemnation.103  The Court could then note that, given today’s more 
accurate application of the NPR standard, the exemption no longer 
performs this function.104  Such a statement could encourage lower 
courts to abandon the exemption, teeing up Supreme Court review. 
Application of the exemption would ordinarily preclude 
consideration of whether the challenged restraints might produce 
redeeming virtues until after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case.  But the Alston Court could answer this question before a full-
blown analysis.  The defendants’ bid to exempt their restraints from 
even Rule of Reason scrutiny necessarily assumes that such 
restraints usually, or even always, produce redeeming virtues by 
protecting and enhancing the amateur nature of NCAA sports from 
 
 101. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. 
 102. Transcript, supra note 84, at 33. 
 103.  Cf. Meese, supra note 21, at 873 (describing assertions by proponents of 
the “Quick Look” Rule of Reason analysis that this approach could soften an over-
inclusive per se rule). 
 104. See id. at 873–74 (explaining how more selective application of the per se 
rule eliminated any putative need for “safety valve” function of the Quick Look). 
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unbridled rivalry for players.105  While not a sufficient condition for 
such an exemption, this assumption is certainly necessary.106 
Recent commentary and some questions at oral argument, 
however, seem to take issue with this threshold assumption by, for 
instance, analogizing limits on player compensation to putative limits 
on coaches’ salaries.107  The latter, of course, would be unlawful per se 
absent the sports league exemption.108  Indeed, the plaintiff began its 
oral argument by characterizing the restraints before the Court as 
“naked horizontal monopsony restraints that would be per se 
unlawful in any context.”109 
This Essay submits that the NCAA dicta correctly signaled that 
agreements restricting player compensation could create redeeming 
virtues, notwithstanding Nick Saban’s unregulated salary.110  To be 
sure, the restraints restrict atomistic rivalry for players.  But as 
Standard Oil itself recognized, some agreements that restrict 
atomistic rivalry have the “legitimate purpose of reasonably 
forwarding personal interest and developing trade” and are thus not 
unreasonable.111  The Court in Sylvania concurred, explaining that 
some restrictions on “a purely competitive situation” can overcome 
free riding, correct a market failure, and enhance inter-brand 
competition.112  There is no reason to suspend this logic because the 
restraints govern buying rather than selling.113  NCAA’s dicta, which 
addressed the validity of compensation limits, expressly invoked 
Sylvania, suggesting that such restraints could “enhance market-
wide competition.”114 
Sylvania and NCAA assumed that product differentiation is 
beneficial.  Moreover, the “more accurate economic conceptions” that 
courts must apply when assessing restraints in “the light of reason” 
bolster NCAA’s assertion that unbridled rivalry will produce 
insufficient differentiation.115  Imagine that schools could include 
non-students on teams, perhaps providing compensation equal to the 
 
 105. See Brief for Petitioner at 9–11, 18–21, Nat. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Alston, No. 20-512 (Mar. 31, 2021). 
 106. Of course, under a straightforward application of the NPR standard or 
ancillary restraints doctrine, courts would have asked and answered this 
question earlier in the process of assessing these restraints. 
 107. See Transcript, supra note 84, at 10 (Thomas, J., asking question). 
 108. See generally Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 134 F. 3d 1010 (10th 
Cir. 1998). 
 109. Transcript, supra note 84, at 42. 
 110. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 111. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).  
 112. Cont‘l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).  
 113. Id. at 54. 
 114. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.  
 115.  Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55, 63. 
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cost of attendance.116  Each team would fully internalize the private 
benefits of including non-students. These benefits could include, for 
example, improved winning percentages.  But no school would 
internalize the full impact of such participation upon the nature of 
the product.  If a few schools chose this route, others would 
predictably follow suit, producing an equilibrium where few, if any, 
schools fielded teams exclusively populated by students.  Only a 
horizontal agreement preventing rostering non-students would 
reliably prevent a race to the bottom that would transform college 
football into a football team owned by a college but full of non-
students.  
The agreement just described is as “pernicious” under NPR as 
one restricting player compensation.117  Both restrict rivalry for 
inputs.  But plaintiffs have properly declined to challenge such 
restrictions.118  This concession reflects recognition that unbridled 
rivalry over the composition of rosters would produce a market failure 
manifesting itself in negative differentiation of the NCAA’s product, 
reduced inter-brand competition, and decreased consumer welfare.119  
Translated into the NPR standard and ancillary restraints test, such 
restrictions can produce redeeming virtues and enhance the efficiency 
of an otherwise valid venture. 
Defendants’ bid for a stronger exemption regarding 
compensation restrictions rests upon a similar claim.  Unbridled 
compensation rivalry, they say, will result in an additional market 
failure, also undermining the quality of the NCAA’s product and 
reducing demand.120  Indeed, plaintiffs have asserted that the 
challenged restraints reduce student-athlete compensation compared 
to what unfettered rivalry will produce.121  Such limits on 
compensation rivalry reinforce the requirement that participants be 
students.  If schools could pay whatever the market would bear, the 
supply of non-student labor would increase significantly, in both 
 
 116. The analysis propounded by this paragraph does not depend upon the 
provision of such compensation. 
 117. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text. 
 118. Transcript, supra note 84, at 50–51 (“[O]f course, we’re not challenging 
any restrictions or rules regarding that they be students.”). 
 119. Id. at 50 (articulating the plaintiffs’ contention that the main distinction 
between professional and collegiate athletics is that the latter is exclusively 
comprised of students). 
 120. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litig. (“Alston”), 958 F.3d 1239, 1248–50, 1257–58, 1260, 1268 (9th Cir. 
2020). 
 121. See id. at 1256–57 (describing the district court’s finding that elite 
student-athletes are “forced to accept . . . whatever compensation is offered to 
them”).  If this is truly the case, then one might ask why the NCAA does not 
replicate the approach taken by the Ivy League, that is, ban members from 
providing any athletic financial aid. See Prospective Athlete Information, THE IVY 
LEAGUE, https://ivyleague.com/sports/2017/7/28/information-psa-index.aspx (last 
visited June 9, 2021). 
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numbers and quality, thus increasing schools’ temptation to include 
non-student participants and undermining the “student-only” policy. 
The defendants, district court, and Ninth Circuit agree that the 
propensity of a restraint to prevent unbridled compensation rivalry 
helps differentiate collegiate from professional sports, improving 
consumer welfare.122  They only disagree as to the magnitude of 
benefits and as to whether the restrictions are broader than 
necessary.123  Thus, both lower courts agreed that restrictions on 
compensation unrelated to education—that is, restrictions that 
prevent the payment of an outright salary—are procompetitive, even 
though such restrictions extinguish the very rivalry that would 
produce the largest increase in student-athlete compensation.124  
Indeed, one implication of Alston’s result is that a less restrictive 
means of achieving the objective would entail voluntary integration, 
independent of any exercise of market power.125  No one has 
articulated a similar account of how limiting coaching staffs to 
students, for instance, or limiting coaches’ salaries to the cost of 
attendance, would distinguish the quality of the product that schools 
offer to paying fans in a manner that would appeal to consumers.126 
However, a conclusion that compensation restraints may produce 
redeeming virtues is simply a necessary condition for application of 
the player eligibility exemption.  Proponents must also explain why 
this stronger exemption is superior to Rule of Reason scrutiny.  
Hopefully, the Court will reject this proposed new exemption, at least 
for now.  As explained in Subpart V.C of this Essay, the basis for the 
 
 122.  See, e.g., Alston, 958 F.3d at 1246–47, 1256–57, 1260.  
 123. See id. at 1254, 1257 (“The NCAA does, however, quarrel with the district 
court’s analysis at the Rule of Reason’s second step[.]”). 
 124. See id. at 1254–55, 1258 (“Not paying student-athletes ‘unlimited 
payments unrelated to education, akin to salaries seen in professional sports 
leagues’ is what makes them ‘amateurs.’” (quoting In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (“Alston”), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 
1083 (N.D. Cal. 2019))).  
 125. The Ivy League, which provides no athletic scholarships, provides an 
example of such horizontal voluntary integration that would be difficult to 
attribute to market power.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit in Alston apparently 
assumed that individual conferences could, without market power, impose 
restraints identical to those the court invalidated. See Alston, 958 F.3d at 1256–
57; see also Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(stating that absence of market power established that defendants adopted 
challenged practice to “make the conduct of their business more effective”); 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 22 & n.39 (1979) 
(highlighting the fact that firms without market power had adopted a practice 
similar to challenged restraint, thereby suggesting that the practice might be 
reasonable). 
 126. Cf. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F. 3d 1010, 1021–24 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (describing and rejecting different purported redeeming virtues that 
supposedly justified limits on the salaries of so-called “restricted earnings 
coaches”). 
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original Quick Look, on which American Needle’s dicta tried to build, 
was questionable at best.127   
Therefore, the pro-plaintiff Quick Look has very little to 
recommend it and is surely no model for further doctrinal evolution 
that completely shields some concerted action from Sherman Act 
scrutiny.  NCAA’s apparent endorsement of “a great majority of such 
restrictions” was dicta and rested in part upon a concession by 
plaintiffs—the University of Georgia and the University of 
Oklahoma—with strong economic interests to preserve such 
restrictions.128  Even on their own terms, these dicta conceded that 
some such restrictions did not enhance competition, thereby implying 
that courts should assess such restraints under the Rule of Reason to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. 
Proponents of narrowing the scope of per se rules in favor of full-
blown Rule of Reason analysis in other contexts have persuasively 
explained that such fact-intensive scrutiny can generate information 
about the actual impact of restraints previously condemned, thereby 
informing future assessment regarding whether something other 
than full-blown analysis is appropriate.129  Such scrutiny can also 
help parties, courts, and scholars hone their theoretical conceptions 
regarding how to think about the impact of such restraints and what 
questions a tribunal should ask when examining them.  By analogy, 
the exemption sought by the defendants would prevent the generation 
of information about the impact of exempted agreements that 
decisions such as O’Bannon and Alston have themselves produced, 
information that scholars and practitioners alike can employ to assess 
their true economic effect.  Perhaps such assessments would confirm 
defendants’ assumption regarding the uniformly procompetitive 
nature of such agreements, but perhaps not. 
Of course, at least in the short run, a full-blown Rule of Reason 
assessment will consume more resources than the defendants’ new 
exemption.  But this would be true of any exemption from ordinary 
full-blown analysis.  Moreover, this putative benefit is partly illusory.  
Once parties understand that inclusion in a particular category will 
obviate Rule of Reason scrutiny, defendants will predictably invest 
resources attempting to convince courts that restraints in fact fall into 
this category, while plaintiffs will invest resources to prove the 
opposite.130  These additional litigation-related investments will 
 
 127.  See supra Subpart V.D.  
 128. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (“Respondents concede that the great majority of the NCAA’s 
regulations enhance competition among member institutions.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope 
and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 461, 488–89 & nn.113–14 
(2000); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (suggesting 
that courts can ultimately dispense with full-blown Rule of Reason assessment 
“if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions”). 
 130. See Meese, supra note 21, at 863–66. 
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partly offset the savings from eliminating full-blown scrutiny.  
Finally, as noted earlier, the prospect of complete exemption from any 
antitrust scrutiny will encourage potential defendants to adopt some 
eligibility related restraints that are anticompetitive on balance, 
knowing as they will that such restraints will be immune from 
antitrust scrutiny.131 
Assuming the Court does reject the defendant’s bid for a new 
exemption, it will finally have to wrestle with the problem that 
consumed the Ninth Circuit—namely, application of the full-blown 
Rule of Reason to the challenged restraints.  Here, NCAA itself 
strongly bolsters the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which found that 
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case by showing that, but for 
the restraints, NCAA members would have provided greater 
compensation to student-athletes—at least those playing football and 
basketball.132  However, as explained in Part V.B of this Essay, this 
approach seems to contradict the apparent rationale for rejecting per 
se condemnation of such restraints in the first place.133  After all, if 
such restraints do in fact avoid per se condemnation, they do so 
because they may produce non-technological efficiencies by 
eliminating or attenuating a market failure.134  Thus, proof that such 
restraints reduce player compensation below the level that unbridled 
rivalry would produce is unremarkable given that such restraints 
would properly survive per se condemnation in the first place.135  That 
is, a conclusion that such proof establishes a prima facie case rests 
upon an arbitrary choice between two entirely different accounts of 
the impact of such restraints; one reflecting a harmful exercise of 
market power and the other reflecting an entirely beneficial example 
of horizontal voluntary integration, closely analogous to the 
numerous almost mundane restraints agreed upon by franchisees 
upon entry into a particular franchise system.136 
To be sure, the plaintiffs have also convinced the Ninth Circuit 
that the defendants possess market power—indeed, a monopsony—in 
a properly defined relevant market, although defendants apparently 
stipulated this market.137  Still, even dominant firms enter 
 
 131.  See supra Subpart V.D. 
 132. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104–07 (invoking the finding that challenged 
restraints resulted in higher prices and reduced output compared to a non-
restraint baseline to establish prima facie case). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 62–71.  
 134. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Meese, supra note 16, at 149–52. 
 136. Id.; see also  Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the 
Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV. 5, 69 & nn.312–14 (2004) (collecting authorities 
demonstrating that franchising contracts are horizontal). 
 137. See In re. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litig. (“Alston”), 958 F.3d 1239, 1248, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (reporting 
that district court adopted this market definition at “the parties’ request”), cert 
granted sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020) 
(mem.). 
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agreements that overcome market failures and produce benefits.138  
Proof that such a firm has entered a contract does not, without more, 
logically give rise to a presumption that the agreement produces 
antitrust harm.  This is so even if the restraint produces prices that 
are higher than those that a non-restraint world would create.  Only 
proof that the challenged restraint reduces output, properly defined, 
would, as a logical matter, suffice to establish a prima facie case.139  
However, plaintiffs apparently made no attempt to define the proper 
measure of output in this context or link the imposition of the 
restraints to any reduction in that measure.   
The Court could therefore reverse and remand for additional 
assessment of whether the plaintiffs have established a prima facie 
case.  The plaintiffs would thus have an opportunity to define the 
proper measure of output and prove that the restraint reduced output 
measured in this manner. 
In any event, regardless of how the plaintiffs have established a 
prima facie case, the defendants have in fact satisfied their burden of 
producing evidence that the challenged restraints produce significant 
benefits.  If the defendants had not discharged this burden, there 
would have been no need for the plaintiffs to adduce evidence of a less 
restrictive alternative that supposedly produces identical benefits.  
Moreover, as explained earlier, proof of such benefits further 
undermines any presumption that a restraint produces 
anticompetitive harm, in this case, by establishing that the 
agreement overcomes a market failure.140  As a result, there is no 
rationale for calculating the magnitude of these benefits or comparing 
such benefits to presumed harms—because there is no longer any 
reason to presume that such harms exist.  Indeed, proof that the 
restraint in fact overcomes a market failure both negates any 
presumption of harm and establishes that the restraint produces 
benefits, thus requiring a conclusion that the practice unambiguously 
improves welfare. 
Proponents of the lower court’s decision may respond that courts 
should nonetheless assess whether there is a less restrictive means of 
achieving the same benefits as the challenged restraints.  Proof that 
such an alternative exists, they might say, suggests that the 
defendants have adopted the restraint mainly or just partly to 
exercise market power.  But any such argument begins with the 
assumption that the restraints are restrictive to begin with.  Absent 
 
 138. See Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the 
Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 743, 845 (2005) (explaining that some “exclusionary 
agreements can overcome market failures” and result in “significant cognizable 
benefits”).  
 139. See Hovenkamp, supra note 42, at 324 (“The plaintiff generally makes 
out a prima facie case by finding an anticompetitive effect, which means either a 
restraint that tends to reduce output or that excludes a significant firm or 
firms.”). 
 140. See supra Subpart V.B. 
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evidence that the restraints have reduced output, proof that they in 
fact overcome a market failure that would have manifested as lower 
pre-restraint prices undermines any presumption that such 
restraints are restrictive in the first place. 
 
